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ABSTRACT 
The text is an analysis of a widespread mistake in the research on Madhyamaka, that is the 
erroneous application of the term “ontology” to the philosophy which is essentially a critique 
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The term “ontology” seems to be quite an obvious description of middle 
way philosophy in mahāyāna. C. W. Huntington, Jr. in his introduction to the 
translation of Candrakīrti speaks about “ontological position” concerning the 
philosophy of emptiness;1 Inada in the introductory essay to his translation of 
Mūlamadhyamakakārikā writes: “The middle path doctrine is the Buddhist 
ontological principle”2 and Nāgārjuna is the one who “gave direction to man 
for his ontological quest.”3 In the monumental Encyclopedia of Indian Philo- 
sophies one can even read about “an ontology that proclaims the emptiness of 
1 C. W. Huntington Jr., Geshé Namgyal Wangchen, The Emptiness of Emptiness. An 
Introduction to Early Indian Madhyamikā, Delhi 2003, p. 18.
2 Nāgārjuna, A Translation of his Mūlamadhyamakakārikā with an Introductory Essay 
by K. K. Inada, Delhi 1993, p. 22.
3 Ibidem.
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everything.”4 These are only a few examples of the tendency to use this term 
as a relevant description of madhyamaka. Unfortunately, this kind of usage of 
the term “ontology” proves to be either a misunderstanding of madhyamaka 
or of ontology or, most probably, of both. The reason arises, I believe, from 
forgetting basic definitions. In this paper I would like to clarify the circum-
stances surrounding the misuse of the term “ontology” as a relevant term for 
describing madhyamaka in the Nāgārjunian sense.
THE ORIGIN OF MISUSE OF THE TERM “ONTOLOGY” IN 
MADHYAMAKA STUDIES
Since the tendency to describe madhyamaka as ontology is quite widespread 
it probably originates from the work of an influential author. In 1953 in Philo- 
sophy East and West E. Conze published his text entitled “The Ontology of 
Prajñāpāramitā”. On the very first page he refers to Nāgārjuna and goes on 
to discuss ontology in the context of the Buddhist philosophy of emptiness in 
mahāyāna. Even though he warns that “It would be a mistake, of course, to re-
gard these texts as philosophical treatises in the European sense of the word,” 
just a few sentences later he decides to use one of the most crucial terms of 
European philosophy to characterise Prajñāpāramitā literature with its later 
continuation and unfolding. He starts in a most unfortunate way:
If ontology in the usual sense is interpreted, however, to mean any attempt to contact 
the true nature of reality, the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras are replete with it.5
The only problem with this interpretation of ontology is that no serious phi-
losopher dealing with ontology has ever defined it in this way. With such 
a general phrase as “attempt to contact the true nature of reality” one can also 
describe epistemology or natural sciences etc. This kind of characteristic was 
never given as a distinguishing feature of ontology so precisely defined by 
Aristotelians or other philosophers. Moreover, the usage of the phrase “true 
nature” shows a lack of familiarity with the ontological discourse of European 
philosophy. The term “true nature” suggests that there may well be some 
“false nature” to be avoided – and this is exactly the reason why it is not used 
4 Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, eds. K. H. Potter et al., Delhi 1999, Vol. VIII, 
p. 229.
5 E. Conze, Ontology of Prajñāpāramitā, “Philosophy East and West” 1953, Vol. 3, 
No. 2, p. 117.
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in European ontology where nature or essence are, of course, inherently true, 
which is why they can play the role of nature or essence, so a collocation like 
“true nature” makes as much sense as “true truth”.
Conze obviously does not know traditional ontology and makes no effort 
to explain it properly in traditional terms and then compare it with the subject 
matter of Prajñāpāramitā literature. On thirteen pages of his text on ontology 
the term appears only five times and with the exception of the fragment quoted 
above, there is only one more time he writes about his understanding of this 
crucial term:
The ontology of the Prajñāpāramitā is a description of the world as it appears to those 
whose self is extinct.6 
Again, if we use such a general phrase as “description of the world” it can in 
no way define ontology since it is simply much too general. Biology is also 
a description of the world, as is physics and even theology could describe 
the world as the creation of some god. If something is a “description of the 
world” it does not meant that it is necessarily an ontology. Fairytales can also 
describe the world for children but to include them within ontology would 
a slight exaggeration.
Ontology can never be a description of something as it appears to some-
body, since it was an investigation of being in itself independent from the way 
it appears to any subject. Ontology as a “description of the world as it appears” 
would never be fundamental and thus would not be an ontology. Furthermore, 
in Buddhism those whose self is extinct are exactly the ones who can see the 
world as it really is and not the world as it appears to any one person – they 
can see dharma as dharma, not dharma as it appears to them. This is a rather 
important point in the Buddhist doctrine, obviously forgotten by Conze.
It is hard to avoid the impression that Conze uses the term “ontology” 
merely in order to make his article sound more serious and, unfortunately, this 
is not the only example of this kind. Probably the most flagrant one would 
be the book on Candrakīrti The Ontology of the Middle Way by Peter Fenner 
where the term “ontology”, with the exception of the title, appears only four 
times in 338 pages. He writes that “the middle path and relational origina-
tion are essentially ontological doctrines.”7 Nowhere does the author of these 
words explain what he means by ontology and one can only guess from the 
next sentence what he had in mind, in which he claims that “The middle path 
6 Ibidem, p. 129.
7 P. Fenner, The Ontology of the Middle Way, Dordrecht–Boston–London 1990, p. 85.
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refers to a perspective which views reality as neither something nor nothing.”8 
This is true regarding the middle way, although it is hardly an ontological 
view. Ontology is the last thing one could ascribe to Candrakīrti who used to 
say that he has no thesis of his own but discusses only to the point where his 
adversaries give up their views. 
THE MEANING OF THE TERM ONTOLOGY  
AND NAGARJUNIAN MIDDLE WAY
The term “ontology” is not so old as we used to think since, despite its Greek 
etymology, it appeared for the first time in Lexicon philosophicum, a work by 
Rudolf Göckel published in 1613. It was introduced as a synonym of the term 
philosophia prima that can be traced back to the Metaphysics of Aristotle. 
Ontology gained its final classical shape in the work of Christian Wolff who 
published his Philosophia prima, sive Ontologia in the year 1729. Generally 
we can say that ontology in its classical form preserved the characteristic of 
philosophia prima formulated by Aristotle:
There is a science which investigates being as being and the attributes which belong 
to this in virtue of its own nature. Now this is not the same as any of the so-called 
special sciences; for none of these others treats universally of being as being. They 
cut off a part of being and investigate the attribute of this part; this is what the math-
ematical sciences for instance do. Now since we are seeking the first principles and 
the highest causes, clearly there must be some thing to which these belong in virtue of 
its own nature. If then those who sought the elements of existing things were seeking 
these same principles, it is necessary that the elements must be elements of being not 
by accident but just because it is being. Therefore it is of being as being that we also 
must grasp the first causes.9
Now it will be easy to distinguish madhyamaka from ontology which is 
so different from it. First of all, ontology in its Aristotelian form presupposes 
the existence of ultimate being. This presupposition is clearly an expression 
of wishful thinking, since Aristotle tries to persuade us that from the fact of 
searching for something, it must follow that the object searched for exists. This 
is clearly not necessarily the case. Nobody will accept this kind of inference. 
When Aristotle says “since we are seeking the first principles and the highest 
8 Ibidem.
9 Aristotle, Metaphysics, translated by W. D. Ross, in: The Basic Works of Aristotle, 
ed. R. McKeon, Random House 1941, 1003a.
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causes, clearly there must be some thing to which these belong in virtue of its 
own nature”10 he presents only a dogmatic standpoint so characteristic also to 
the opponents of madhyamaka philosophers. In ontology generally there is no 
place for questioning the notion of being; being is presupposed as the main 
irreducible principle. This one main assumption is enough to understand how 
enormous the gap is between a traditional ontological approach and that of 
madhyamaka. One of the targets madhyamaka criticises is in fact ontology. 
Any kind of being is dismissed by madhyamaka, so what then is the sense of 
placing madhyamaka under the banner of ontology?
Secondly, one of the main notions of ontology is essence. Without es-
sence there is no being or thing, according to ontology. Essence is the axiom 
of ontology. That is why it is enough to read just the second and third stanza 
from Nāgārjuna’s Śūnyatāsaptati to know that ontology is the worst name for 
madhyamaka since the main meaning of emptiness is to be empty of essence.
(2) Substance does not exist, there is no non-substance,
There is no substance-non-substance, and that is why there is nothing to be explained.
All dharmas to be explained
Like nirvana are empty of essence.
(3) Since the essence of any thing
Does not exist in cause, conditions, their combination,
Or in any of them separately, or in all of them,
It is empty.11
Also Candrakīrti ends his commentary to chapter 15 of Mūlamadhya-
makakārikā saying that what is meant by the non-existence of things is the 
lack of essence. How can we then say that madhyamaka is “an ontology 
that proclaims the emptiness of everything?”12 This is self-contradiction! That 
which is empty of essence will never be proclaimed by ontology since what 
it tries to establish is a being endowed with or even full of essence. That is 
why emptiness can not be any ontological concept even though another Bud-
dhist encyclopaedia tries to persuade us with nonsense such as “ontological 
10 Ibidem.
11 Nāgārjuna, Śunyatāsaptatiḥ with Auto-Commentary, Central Institute of Higher Ti-
betan Studies, Sarnath, Varanasi 1996, 74n: (2) bdag med bdag med min bdag dang// bad 
med min pas brjod ‘ga’ med// brjod par bya ba’i chos rnams kun// mya ngan ‘das mtshungs 
rang bzhin stong// (3) gang phyir dngos po thams cad kyi// rang bzhin rgyu rkyen tshogs 
pa’am// so so rnams la’am thams cad la// yod min de phyir stong pa yin//
12 Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, op. cit., p. 229.
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categories as the two truths, no-self and emptiness”13 in the discourse of Can-
drakīrti.14 Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti put so much effort into criticising such 
classical ontological categories like cause, effect, essence, being, individual or 
self etc. that labelling their work with the name of ontology is ridiculous. The 
philosophy of Aristotle is ontology but not madhyamaka!
Thirdly, ontology strives to give the only and correct description of reality 
or the structure of reality that must be set up as a system. This is exactly what 
madhyamaka philosophers do not want to do – they do not want to build any 
kind of philosophical system. In the famous passage from Vigrahavyāvartanī, 
Nāgārjuna says that just advancing any thesis would be an error:
If I had any thesis, that fault would apply to me.
But I do not have any thesis,
So there is indeed no fault for me.15
Candrakīrti explains that the Madhyamaka philosopher speaks only because 
he is faced with theses proposed by somebody else but he himself has no 
assertion to pursue: “He makes no use of reasons and examples but pursues 
his own thesis only until the adversary gives up his.”16 This kind of proce-
dure is much closer to Greek skepticism than to the ontology that was put 
into question by skeptics.17 We simply have to remember that even though in 
madhyamaka we can find a lot of discussion on such ontological categories as 
cause, effect, being, and essence, the middle way philosophy is not the type 
of discourse which tries to show them as fundamental and irreducible. Its aim 
is exactly the opposite: to undermine every foundation. “In madhyamaka, no 
13 Encyclopedia of Buddhism, eds. R. E. Buswell, Jr. et al., New York 2004, p. 152.
14 From the same entry we can also learn something quite surprising, namely that 
“Madhyamaka philosopher must avoid syllogistic reasoning, and must defeat opponents 
solely through drawing out the absurd consequences of their own statements” (ibidem). 
Unfortunately the method of drawing conclusions without using syllogism remains the 
secret of the author of the entry on Candrakīrti. 
15 J. Westerhoff, The Dispeller of Disputes. Nāgārjuna’s Vigrahavyāvartanī, New York 
2010, verse 29.
16 Candrakīrti, Lucid Exposition of the Middle Way. The Essential Chapters from the 
Prasannapadā of Candrakīrti, trans. Mervyn Sprung, London 1979, pp. 37–38).
17 Cf. „Madhyamaka and Classical Greek Scepticism” by Georges Dreyfus and Jay L. 
Garfield in: G. Dreyfus, J. L. Garfield et al., Moonshadows. Conventional Truth in Buddhist 
Philosophy, New York 2011, pp. 115–130.  
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effort is made to establish any ontology.”18 In madhyamaka, no effort is made 
to establish anything. Contrary to the claim of Nagao, that “True ontology can 
be said to have begun with the advent of Mahāyāna or with the appearance of 
Nāgārjuna,”19 his appearance marks the death of true ontology.
Fourthly, the next main category of ontology is truth.20 In classical on-
tology the notion of truth is always rooted in being as being (for example in 
Wolff). Again this is the tradition that is traced back to Aristotle stating: “As 
each thing is in respect of being, so is it in respect of truth.”21 No doubt this 
is another deep difference between ontology and madhyamaka. The notion 
of correspondence so crucial for the classical understanding of truth does not 
function in madhyamaka discourse. In a famous passage from Metaphysics it 
was formulated as follows: “It is not because we think truly that you are pale, 
that you are pale, but because you are pale we who say this have the truth.”22 
What is presupposed here is that a certain being has certain qualities and so 
the truth then concerns the conformity between it and the statement about it. In 
madhyamaka such a situation is ultimately impossible,23 since ultimately there 
is no thing that possesses certain attributes, so the correspondence between 
what is said and what exists is impossible. In madhyamaka “the ultimate truth 
is that there is no ultimate truth.”24 
Nevertheless Conze claims that in the case of Buddhist philosophy, which 
is not interested in the notion of being, we can talk about a “new ontology”25 
with its “principle of Buddhist ontology, which is common to all schools and 
has been formulated on many occasions.’ It states that the truth ‘lies in the mid-
dle’ between ‘it is’ and ‘it is not.’”26 Conze does not elaborate on the notion of 
18 K. Brunnhölzl, The Center of the Sunlit Sky. Madhyamaka in the Kagyü Tradition, 
New York 2004, p. 159.
19 G. M. Nagao, Mādhyamika and Yogācāra. A Study of Mahāyāna Philosophies, Al-
bany 1991, p. 166.
20 The notion of truth is one of the widest topics so here we have room only for the 
most general remarks. 
21 Aristotle, op. cit., 993b.
22 Ibidem, 1051b.
23 Of course we can not forget that Madhyamaka makes use of so called “worldly 
conventions” but does so in order to lead towards ultimately inexpressible enlightenment.
24 M. Siderits, Thinking on Empty: Mādhyamaka Anti-Realism and Canons of Ratio-
nality, [in:] Rationality in Question, eds. S. Biderman and B. A. Schaufstein, Dordrecht 
1989, p. 6.
25 Inada takes over this term. Cf. K. K. Inada, The Range of Buddhist Ontology, “Phi-
losophy East and West” 1988, Vol. 38, No. 3, p. 263.
26 E. Conze, Buddhist Thought in India. Three Phases of Buddhist Philosophy, London 
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truth, so the reader hardly knows what is meant by this term in his book. But 
since he contrasts this view with that of Aristotle, claiming that being can not 
be contradictory, he probably means that the referent of a true statement is not 
any kind of being but that which lies in between the extremes of existence and 
non-existence. The only problem then is that unfortunately there is nothing in 
between them that one can speak of and all the more speak of truthfully. 
To sum up, if somebody claims Madhyamaka to be a kind of ontology, the 
implication is that it is a form of science in search of the highest principles of 
being and its essential attributes, placing the notion of essence in the centre 
of the philosophical system. Nobody could agree that this is the standpoint 
of middle way discourse. Were somebody to attempt to hold on to the argu-
ment that the highest principle is emptiness and that this is why we can define 
madhyamaka as a search for the highest principles called ontology, we would 
surely answer: please remember that ontology comes from the Greek ontos on 
– being; ontology is the science of being! This is exactly what is neglected by 
Nagao who says “ontology in a Buddhist context is not an ontology of ‘being,’ 
but that of śūnyatā.”27 What is so pitiful about these kinds of claims is that they 
are made with premeditation - the author knows that ontology is the science of 
being yet uses this term to describe the philosophy of emptiness that criticises 
and gives up this notion. What is the point of this kind of deliberate strategy? 
What is achieved or gained by calling Nāgārjunian middle way an ontology? 
If we called madhyamaka an ontology we would say in fact that emptiness is 
a kind of being which is one of the most serious philosophical diseases that 
should be cured with the emptiness of emptiness:
Absence of essence in phenomena is called emptiness by the wise ones. This emptiness 
is also empty. Empty of nature, as it is said. Emptiness of the so called emptiness is 
said to be emptiness of emptiness. It was taught in order to refute intellectual grasping 
of emptiness as object.28
1962, p. 219. Eckel uncritically repeats this error: “a valid ontology is worked out only 
in the middle ground between the two extremes” (M. D. Eckel, Bhāvaviveka’s Critique of 
Yogācāra in Ch. XXV of the Prajñāpradipa, [in:] Indiske Studies 5: Miscellanea Buddhica, 
ed. Chr. Lindtner, Copenhagen 1985, p. 31).
27 G. M. Nagao, op. cit., p. 187.
28 Candrakīrti, Madhyamakāvatāra 6. 185–186: chos rnams rang bzhin med pa nyid// 
mkhas pas stong pa nyid ces bsnyad// stong nyid de yang stong nyid kyi// ngo bos stong 
par ‘dod pa yin// stong nyid ces bya’i stong nyid gang// stong nyid stong nyid du ‘dod de// 
stong nyid dngos po’i blo can gyi// ‘dzin pa bzlog phyir gsungs pa yin//.
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This medicine was not taken by Conze and his uncritical followers. Luck-
ily, there are also counterexamples like Ruegg, one of the most prominent 
scholars investigating middle way philosophy, who never refers to it as onto- 
logy, proving thus that one can perfectly assess Nāgārjunian philosophy with-
out misinterpreting it or basic European notions.29 
Referring madhyamaka to European philosophy is essential for choosing 
the correct terminology for translation, since when translating Asian philos-
ophy into European languages, we have to use European philosophical ter-
minology simply because this is the only terminology we have (if somebody 
does not know this terminology, how can he offer a proper translation?). This 
is also – or even first of all – essential for understanding Asian philosophy be-
cause we are brought up in a certain philosophical context that determines the 
shape of our thinking. Lack of knowledge of European philosophy is a serious 
obstacle in understanding Asian philosophy. 
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